Technical Program

Day 1 - August 22, 2011

Time Event
8:30 - 8:50
Welcome and opening remarks
8:50 - 10:30 Market Design and Interfaces
Strategyproofness for "Price Takers" as a Desideratum for Market Design
Eduardo Azevedo and Eric Budish
Market User Interface Design
Sven Seuken, David Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski and Desney Tan
Evaluating Hidden Market Design
Florian Teschner and Christof Weinhardt
Expectations: Point-Estimates, Probability Distributions, Confidence, and Forecasts
David Rothschild
11:00 - 12:00
Invited talk
12:00 - 1:30
Lunch Break
1:30 - 3:10 Internet and Information Markets
Automated Market Makers That Enable New Settings: Extending Constant-Utility Cost Functions
Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm
Instructor Rating Markets
Mithun Chakraborty, Sanmay Das, Allen Lavoie, Malik Magdon-Ismail and Yonatan Naamad
An Experimental Study of Sponsored-Search Auctions
Syngjoo Choi, Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim
Sharing in BitTorrent can be Rational
Mike Ruberry and Sven Seuken
3:40 - 5:00 Combinatorial Mechanisms
Hierarchical Package Bidding: Computational Complexity & Bidder Behavior
Riko Jacob, Tobias Scheffel, Georg Ziegler and Martin Bichler
Bidding Behavior, Efficiency, and Auctioneer Revenue in the Combinatorial Clock Auction
Martin Bichler, Pasha Shabalin and Juergen Wolf
A Framework for Automated Bundling and Pricing Using Purchase Data
Michael Benisch and Tuomas Sandholm
6:30 - 8:30
Dinner

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Day 2 - August 23, 2011

Time Event
8:50 - 10:30 Auction Theory
Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions
Pablo Azar, Jing Chen and Silvio Micali
Approximation of Large Games with Applications to Uniform Price Auctions
Aaron Bodoh-Creed
Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case
Ron Lavi and Sigal Oren
Improving Allocations Through Revenue Redistribution in Auctions with Entry
Ruggiero Cavallo
11:00 - 12:00
Invited talk
12:00 - 1:30
Lunch Break
1:30 - 2:45 Matching and Double Auctions
Bubbles, Crashes and Efficiency with Double Auction Mechanisms
Jinpeng Ma and Qiongling Li
From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on A Family of School Choice Mechanisms
Yan Chen and Onur Kesten
Stability and Efficiency in the General-Priority-Based Assignment
Aytek Erdil and Taro Kumano
3:15 - 4:30 Novel Applications
Solids - a combinatorial auction for a housing corporation
Nicholas Dries Goossens, Sander Onderstal and Frits Spieksma
A computational monetary market for plug-in electric vehicle charging
Matteo Vasirani and Sascha Ossowski
An Online Mechanism for Multi-Speed Electric Vehicle Charging
Valentin Robu, Sebastian Stein, Enrico Gerding, David Parkes, Alex Rogers and Nicholas Jennings

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Dates & News

Submission Deadline
April 22, 2011

Notification of acceptance/rejection
May 30, 2011

Final versions of archival papers due
June 24, 2011

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